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This paper considers aspects of the competitive selection process in China - firm entry, 
survival, and exit - in an important sector of manufacturing, looking in particular for 
changes resulting from the latest stage of reforms.  Using industry survey data from a 
province  in  North-East  China,  we  find  substantial  differences  in  the  process  between 
ownership types. By conducting a simple decomposition of the aggregate productivity 
growth  and  exploring  the  determinants  of  firm’s  exit  using  a  hazard  rate  model,  we 
observe  a  substantial  rate  of  churning  of  enterprises  in  the  sector,  and  find  that  the 
competitive  selection  processes  operate,  for  small  and  collectively  owned  enterprises 
(COEs),  in  a  manner  consistent  with  a  private  market  economy.  In  contrast,  such 
processes appear not to be functioning for state owned enterprises (SOEs). We conclude 
that competitive selection in China is not providing a sufficiently strong substitute for 




Key Words: Competition; Exit; Productivity, Hazard Models 
 
JEL Classification: C5, D2, L6, P5 
 
 
Date of this version: June 25, 2009 
 
 
¶ New Zealand Commerce Commission, 44 The Terrace, Wellington, NZ, E-MAIL: 
qing.yang@comcom.govt.nz 
 
† Corresponding author. Department of Economics, University of Surrey, Guildford, 
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK, E-MAIL:p.temple@surrey.ac.uk;Tel:00 44 1483300800   
Introduction 
 
Since  the  1980s,  while  transforming  itself  from  a  centrally  planned  economy  to  an 
emerging market economy, China has achieved a 10% average rate of growth in GDP, 
with per capita GDP more than quadrupling. However, a central paradox of the recent 
impressive record in China is that it has been achieved in the absence of a number of 
factors  commonly  deemed  to  be  pre-requisites  of  successful  transition.  These  include 
reasonably  complete  market  liberalization,  large-scale  privatisations,  secure  private 
property rights, and democracy (Chow, 1997). Resolution of the paradox is important 
when assessing the role of current and future reforms.  
 
As far  as liberalization is concerned, it may however be  argued that the ‘competitive 
selection process’ by which firms enter and leave industries has a vital role in creating a 
competitive market environment and may act as a partial substitute for the absence of a 
large scale privatisation process (and for forms of corporate governance based on private 
ownership). This competitive selection process is shown to be especially important for 
small  firms  in  the  electrical  equipment  manufacturing  sector  we  investigate.  Such  a 
process is based on an exit mechanism for individual enterprises, allowing unprofitable 
firms  to  decline  and  fail.  As  a  result,  Alchian  (1950)  argued  that  profit-  maximising 
behaviour  in  a  market  economy  is  ensured,  since  a  lack  of  profits  threatens  a  firm’s 
survival. In this paper we explicitly model the impact of China’s reforms on this selection 
process. 
 
Investigating  the  factors  governing  the  process  of  exit  of  enterprises  in  the  Chinese 
economy is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, China’s idea of gradual reform 
aims to encourage the entry of new firms and phase out the old inefficient SOEs through 
bankruptcy and restructuring. Therefore, a study of firms’ exit and survival behaviour can 
shed light on how gradual reform works. Secondly, exits have played and are playing an 
important economic role in the transition to a market economy. On one hand, the exit of inefficient  firms  releases  scarce  resources,  reducing  inefficiency  and  facilitating  the 
prospects for new firms entering the industry, promoting entrepreneurship (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1997). On the other hand it provides credible threats to incumbent firms (Jensen, 
1988; Hart, 1995), which may then hasten various types of restructuring.  However, exits 
involve  costs  (Ericsson,  1994),  and  in  special  circumstance  exits  may  lead  to  the 
disorganisation of the entire economy. Thirdly, by studying the firms’ exit behaviour and 
its determinants and comparing it with its counterparts in advanced economies, we can 
estimate to what extent the market mechanism is functioning and to what extent the old 
legacy is still in evidence.. 
 
As  a  working  hypothesis  it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  old  state-  owned 
enterprises (SOEs) - which were designed for the old central planning system and where 
inefficiency is allegedly pervasive - are less likely to survive in the face of competition from 
new innovative non-state firms. However, in the Chinese case we suspect that a number 
of factors contribute to rather strong barriers to exit, in particular  the high economic and 
social costs associated with closure, such as the possible increase in unemployment and 
the potential for social unrest.  In this paper, we are therefore primarily concerned with 
the questions  of  what  determines  the  exit  of  Chinese  firms in  the  process of  China’s 
transition to a market economy, what constitute the barriers to firms’ exit, and whether 
these barriers have changed to any great extent as a result of the reforms taking place 
under the Socialist Market Economy.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section provides an overview of the reform 
process and its implications for the performance of manufacturing enterprise in China. 
The third section looks at the dynamics of output, employment, and productivity growth 
in China. A key objective of this section is to ascertain whether the latest phase of reforms 
has substantially changed the pattern of growth substantially as it relates to the entry, exit 
and survival of firms.  The fourth section considers in more detail the empirical analysis of 
exit.  In  the  penultimate  section,  we  employ  a  hazard  rate  model  to  explore  the 
determinants of firm exit. The final section concludes.  
  
 
2.  The Transition Process in China 
 
The ‘reform  and opening up’ policy proposed  in the Third Plenum of The Eleventh 
Congress of the Communist Party on December 18-22, 1978 marked the beginning of 
China’s reform era. At the beginning of the reform process, China’s policy makers had 
reasonably clear objectives relating to the increase of productivity and the improvement 
of living standards. But at that time, even in the western countries, let alone in socialist 
countries, deregulation and privatization remained controversial topics. Hence there was 
no obvious model to serve as a guide. The reforms consequently proceeded by using an 
experimental  method,  referred  to  as  ‘crossing  the  river  by  groping  for  stones’.  The 
reforms were initially implemented in a few selected cities, before being rolled out at the 
national level. This initial phase was characterized by the continued dominance of the 
planning  mechanism  while  trying  to  establish  a  ‘balance’  between  the  plan  and  the 
market. 
 
By the end of 1992, the China’s economic system was still halfway between a planned 
system and a market system. In September of that year however, the Fourteenth Congress 
of  Chinese  Communist  Party  endorsed  for  the  first  time  the  objective  of  building  a 
‘socialist market economy’. The explicit nature of the target should be contrasted with the 
earlier philosophy of ‘groping for stones’ and marked a specific break with the first stage.  
In 1997, the Fifteenth Party congress made a breakthrough on ownership issues, with 
private ownership being upgraded to an ‘important component of economy’ rather than 
being merely that of a ‘supplementary component’. And more recently, in 1999, private 
ownership  and  the  rule  of law were  incorporated  into  the  Chinese  Constitution,  and 
private ownership was given equal standing with State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  
 
At the enterprise level, the post 1993 reforms established the foundations of a modern 
company system. At the outset of this stage, enterprises were merged to take advantage of 
scale economies as well as to help mobilize resources. Most of the merger decisions were made by the government rather than at the level of the enterprises themselves. Some 
enterprises were incorporated, and some accessory services were spun off. Intra-enterprise 
contracts of various kinds have also been widely introduced. Since 1995, there has been 
large-scale privatization of small and medium SOEs, and of collectively owned enterprises 
(COEs), as well as the beginnings of layoffs of state workers on a large scale, with some 
insolvent enterprises being allowed to go bankrupt. Larger companies were also floated 
on the stock market, and by the end of 2002 there are more than 1200 listed companies 
in  China’s  Shanghai  and  Shenzhen  stock  markets.  Debt  conversion  to  equity  is  now 
beginning  to  be  implemented  for  larger  companies  to  wipe  out  the  debt  historically 
incurred  by  large  and  strategically  important  SOEs.  At  the  same  time,  monopoly 
positions  in  both  the  telecommunications  and  electricity  supply  industry    are  being 
dismantled 
 
Ostensibly therefore the reforms since 1992 may have been expected to have impacts on 
enterprise performance via both product market and capital market effects. Our concern 
in this paper is limited to the former and to the measurable dimensions of the competitive 
process, assessing the respective roles played by entry, exit and incumbent firm growth in 
an important  sector of  manufacturing within  a single province. Accordingly, the next 
section  performs  some  relatively  straightforward  decompositions  of  output  and 
productivity growth  
 
 
3.    A  Preliminary  Analysis  of  the  Industrial  Dynamics  in  the 
Electrical Equipment Manufacturing Sector 
 
To begin the analysis it is useful to consider the effectiveness of the competitive selection 
process by examining measurable characteristics of the processes of entry, exit and growth 
and how they have changed with reform, using the periodization considered in the last 
section. 
 The creation, survival and growth of the newly established firms and the downsizing and 
possible exit of the traditionally large, dominant state owned firms are both important  to 
the success of both the transition process itself and also to the long-term health of those 
economies, forming the two sides of Schumpeterian creative destruction (Stiglitz, 1999). 
Moreover, the process of exit is likely to become much more important as the movement 
of surplus labor from the countryside to the towns slows down. In the context of China 
however, the academic and policy communities have concentrated on the role of the 
entry of new firms (e.g. Jackson  et  al (1999), Qian (1999)), while largely ignoring the 
extent and role of the exit of older and less efficient firms.   
 
The data used in this investigation covers almost the complete population of Chinese 
firms in the electrical equipment manufacturing industry in Liaoning, a Northern China 
Province, over a ten-year period starting from 1987 to 1996. This province used to be the 
centre of China’s Manufacturing Industry, and is an area where the central planning 
system had perhaps been most deeply rooted. Of its 14 cities, five are coastal cities; one of 
these latter - Dalian - was one of the earliest cities to have been opened up to the outside 
world.  Arguably therefore, the enterprise reforms in this province, especially the reform 
of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), are representative of the enterprise reform in China’s 
manufacturing sector more generally.  
 
The electrical equipment manufacturing industry is a sector where traditionally the SOEs 
have  dominated,  especially  in  the  manufacturing  of  electric  motor,  generators, 
transformers and electricity distribution and control apparatus, but where currently the 
new  entry  of  non-SOEs  has  been  relatively  easy,  especially  in  the  manufacturing  of 
domestic appliances, electrical lighting equipment, etc. Arguably therefore the selection of 
this sector is to some extent representative of the stage of the reform discussed in this 
paper. This sector accounts for around 5% of the province’s gross industry output. The 
dataset is an unbalanced panel of 3992 firms – the number of different entities appearing 
at any stage over the whole period examined from 1987-1996; there were 1092 firms in 
1986 and 1632 in 1996.  Table 1 provides data on the number of firms and size of 
industry for all the 3 digit industry within electrical equipment manufacturing industry.  Around 98% of the firms are small and medium firms, the markets for which are mainly 
local or at most provincial.  
 
Table 1. Number of Plants, and Industry Size 
 Electrical Equipment Manufacturing Sectors for Selected Years 














Manufacture of Electricity 
Generator and Electric 
Motors  59  33.5  74  39.8  93  46.4 
Manufacture of Electricity 
Transforms, and 
Distribution and Control 
Apparatus  430  98.5  558  101.7  628  102.4 
Manufacture of Wiring, 
Wiring Devices, Batteries, 
and Accumulators  247  52.6  321  59.7  344  49.2 
Manufacture of Electric 
lighting Equipment  96  22.4  100  22.2  104  15.8 
Manufacture of Domestic 
Appliances  108  23.5  182  25.7  214  40.4 
Repair of Electrical 
Equipment  95  3.9  115  5.1  146  11.0 
Manufacture of Other 
Electrical Equipment  57  8.0  68  7.6  109  12.1 
 
Total Electrical 




These industries have undergone different patterns of expansion and contraction over the 
10 year period of our data.  
 
In this section we consider some simple decompositions of output change by firm type 
and in terms of survivorship (the sub-set of firms who exist at both the beginning and the 
end of the period in question). Figure 1 shows the contribution to the growth of output of 
entry, exit, and survival for the whole period and the two sub periods. It suggests that 
there was a big increase in the importance of ‘churning’ of enterprises between the two-
sub periods with both the positive contribution of entry and the negative contribution of 
increasing substantially. Indeed, in the period since the reforms, the net impact of entry 
and exit is clearly more important than the growth of surviving firms.   
Fig 1 Contributions of Entry, Exit, and Survival to the Output Growth of 















Superficially, the evidence from Figure 1 suggests a sharpening of the competitive process 
over the period under investigation. Establishing such a conclusion, however, requires a 
more explicit assessment of both the hazard represented by exit and the competitiveness 
of new entrants for which we need a performance measure. Here we focus on labour 
productivity1.  
 
Following  the  method  proposed  by  Baily  et  al.  (1992)  and  modified  by  Haltiwanger 
(1997), we decompose the growth of labor productivity into the contribution of entrants, 
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where  D refers to changes over the  k -year interval between the first year ( k t - ) and the 
last year (t);  it q  is the share of firm i in the given sector at time t; C ,  N , and  X  are sets 
of  continuing,  entering,  and  exiting  firms,  respectively;  and  P   is  the  aggregate 
(i.e. weighted average) productivity level of the sector as of the first year  k t - . Hence 
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q  represents the change of labor productivity 
attributed to new entry, and  ) ( P p k it
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- ∑q represents the change of labor productivity 
due to firms’ exit.  
 
The decomposition results for labour productivity are shown in Figure 2 which shows the 
contribution of entry, exit, and survival to the sector’s productivity growth. It suggests that 
(on the average) all three components made positive contributions to productivity growth 
over both sub-periods. While the major impact was coming from entrants, survivors and 
exits also contribute a substantial percentage of overall productivity growth. Moreover, 
exits do appear to have increased their role over the sub-periods. To progress further, and 
consider how the reforms may have impacted upon exit behaviour across different firm 






                                                                                                                                  
1 Ideally perhaps we would want to examine total factor productivity. However, we suspect that within a 
specific sector, movements in labor productivity may represent a reasonable proxy for movements in total 
factor productivity.  
 Fig. 2 Contributions of Entry, Exit, and Survival to the Labour Productivity Growth of 
















4. The Role and Determinants of Exit Behaviour  
 
It is helpful at this stage to consider some existing work on economic models of industrial 
evolution  and  competitive  selection,  and  the  processes  that  generate  entry,  exit,  and 
productivity growth.  In many of these models, outcomes are depicted as a result of the 
optimal behavior of forward-looking entrepreneurs with rational expectations but limited 
information. For example, in the contribution by Hopenhayn (1992) considers a model in 
which  firms  differ  only  in  terms  of  their  productivity  levels,  each  of  which  evolves 
according to an exogenous Markov process. New firms enter when the distribution from 
which they draw their initial productivity level is sufficiently favorable for their expected 
future profit stream, net of annual fixed costs, to cover the sunk costs of entry. Firms exit 
when they experience a series of adverse productivity shocks, driving their expected future 











1992-96this  particular  model  are  shared  with  other  representations  of  industrial  evolution  as 
developed by Jovanovic (1982) and Ericson and Pakes (1995). At any point in time, an 
entire distribution of firms with different sizes, ages and productivity levels coexist, and 
simultaneous entry and exit is the norm. Young firms have not yet survived a shakedown 
process, so they tend to be smaller and to exit more frequently. Large firms are the most 
efficient,  on  average,  so  their  mark-ups  are  the  largest.  Nonetheless,  despite  the 
heterogeneity, equilibrium in both Jovanovic’s and Hopenhayn’s model maximises the 
net discounted value of social surplus. Thus market interventions generally make matters 
worse and in this sense the competitive process is optimal. Exit is however crucial to the 
process – typically firms exit as they learn about their true productivity levels.  
 
From an empirical perspective, a number of studies have examined the dynamic aspects 
of firm behavior in the context of advanced economies, beginning with Hart and Prais’s 
[1956] pioneering work of the growth of British companies.  
  
Empirical studies of the processes of entry and exit for the developed economies tend to 
indicate that industry characteristics explain a large amount of the variation observed not 
only between industries but also within industries over time. The variables associated with 
observed differences across industries include sunk costs, absolute capital requirements, 
minimum efficient scale, and market concentration (Bain, 1969).  Moreover, as Shapiro 
and  Khemani  (1987)  showed  in  a  study  of  143  four-digit  Canadian  Manufacturing 
industries, over 1972-76, these variables tend to be associated with both barriers to entry 
and barriers to exit. A number of other studies have confirmed the correlation between 
entries and exits (e.g. Dunne et al. 1988) for US manufacturing industries, Schwalbach 
(1991) on German manufacturing industries, Geroski (1991) on British firm and Baldwin 
and Gorecki (1989) on Canadian industries). The positive correlation between entry and 
exit flows, which appears to be especially marked among small firms, has been described 
as a ‘revolving door’ at the bottom of the industry size distribution.  
  
Other studies indicate that entry and exit rates tend to be positively influenced by both 
expected rates of return in the industry and by its growth rate (e.g. Acs and Audretsch 1989). Firm specific effects have also been found to be important, for example small firm 
size is found to be positively correlated with higher firm exit probabilities (e.g. Lieberman 
1990). However, some of the important features of firms pre-exit, and which may have 
significant impacts upon firms’ closure decisions, such as their performance, leverage or 
governance structure. Indeed, as far as the transition economies are concerned, we are 
unaware of similar empirical work on entry and exit for the transition economies, where 
the focus has tended to be on the role of new entry or on the restructuring of large state 
owned  enterprises.  In  addition  to  the  effects  generally  found  to  be  important  in  the 
advanced economies, it is clear that a number of additional factors need to be considered 
in  the  context  of  transitional  economies  in  general  and  the  Chinese  economy  in 
particular. The extent of heterogeneity across industries found in the advanced economies 
across industries and evidently related to big differences in growth rates, sunk costs etc, 
provides an important reason for concentrating on a particular sector – in our case that of 
electrical equipment manufacturing.     
 
The exit of inefficient firms in transition economies is potentially an important element in 
reducing social waste and mobilizing resources more efficiently. In addition of course, it 
also provides a credible threat to the incumbent firms, which may then hasten their own 
restructuring. As one the objectives of the transition is to eliminate subsidies to the state 
sectors and reallocate the resources to their best use, the state owned enterprises (SOEs) - 
which are built for the old central planning system and where inefficiency is allegedly 
pervasive - are less likely to survive competition from newly established firms. That the 
old state owned  enterprises  are  more  likely  to  exit  seems to  be  a  logical  assumption. 
However,  we  suspect  that,  in  the  Chinese  case,  the  high  economic  and  social  costs 
associated with the closure of state owned enterprises create strong barriers to exit. This 
prevents  the  more  inefficient  state  owned  enterprises  from  closing  down.  We  are 
particularly concerned with the question of whether barriers to exit have changed to any 
great extent as a result of the reforms taking place under the Socialist Market Economy. 
However, before proceeding to an empirical model the definition of an ‘exit’ needs to be 
considered in the Chinese context.   
 In China, there were many possible reasons for the disappearance of firms in our dataset. 
One  is  that  the  owner  (either  a  government  department  in  terms  of  SOEs,  the 
‘community’ in terms of COEs or private individuals in the case of both foreign and 
domestic  private  owned  enterprises)  may  decide  to  close  down  an  under-performing 
enterprise.  In  fact,  the  first  ever  public  ownership  bankruptcy  occurred  in  Electrical 
equipment manufacturing industry and in Liaoning province. However, it happened in 
1986, before the enactment of China’s bankruptcy law, which our dataset unfortunately 
did not cover. Since then, the number of bankruptcies in China has risen sharply from 98 
in 1989 to 5048 in 1997 (Li, 2001).  Another important cause is merger and acquisition, 
quite  possibly  involving  a  government  prompted  merger  of  a  poor  performer  with  a 
successful one, with the aim of saving the former from bankruptcy. The merger may also 
happen  voluntarily, without  the interference of  the  government.    A  third  reason  is  a 
change of ownership. This may take various forms: joint ventures where foreign capital 
dominates, firms being sold out to the public, firms being sold out to individuals, firms 
being  sold  out  to  employees  and  management.  The  last  two  processes  have  a 
characteristic Chinese name, GaiZhi, meaning changing mechanisms, yet by international 
standards, GaiZhi really is privatization. The final reason for exit in the current dataset is 
that a firm may change its main industry.  
 
With the ensuing econometric analysis in mind, we need to consider here the following 




Ownership.  Our  data  allows  us  to  classify  enterprises  into  4  groups,  State-  Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), Collectively-Owned Enterprises (COEs), Foreign-Invested Firms, and 
firms  categorised  as  ‘Others’  including  Domestic  Privately-Owned  Enterprises,  and 
Shareholding  Companies,  etc.    The  ownership  form  is  likely  to  be  an  important 
determinant of exit in the Chinese context, though the relationship may be complex. 
While,  for  example,  SOEs  may  be  inefficient,  the  probability  of  their  exit  may  be 
influenced  by  a  consideration  of  the  social  costs  and  resistance  associated  with  their closure. Moreover, the differential fiscal and legal treatment of enterprises according to 
ownership form (and for which we cannot adequately account) may also be important.  
 
Enterprise age. As suggested in the theoretical literature, newer enterprises may still be 
learning  about  their  true  productivity  levels.  Moreover,  those  enterprises  that  have 
survived the longest have established themselves in the market, and may be better able to 
survive  an  adverse  shock  of  given  size  (e.g.,  through  trademarks,  “goodwill”  and 
established  links  to  suppliers  or  to  the  capital  market).  In  the  context  of  transition 
economies, the effect may be strengthened since established firms are frequently the place 
where  traditional  planning  mechanisms  and  vested  interests  are  most  deeply  rooted. 
However, old firms burdened with established organisation-specific knowledge acquired 
during  the  socialist  era  might  be  slower  in  acquiring  organisation-specific  knowledge 
adaptable  in  a  market  economy,  and  therefore  be  slower  in  learning  to  survive  in  a 
market economy. 
 
Enterprise size. The bigger a firm is, the more likely it is to enjoy economies of scale, 
and the more likely it is to invest in R&D, marketing strategies and information gathering. 
They have also survived and grown throughout various internal and external shocks, and 
have accumulated competitive assets and skills as well, therefore, they are more likely to 
survive.  In  China,  for  administrative  purposes,  China’s  State  Planning  Committee 
classifies a firm as large, medium, or small according to its productive capital and its 
production capacity, and makes policies according to this classification. Therefore firm 
size captures not just the advantages of large firms over small firms in economies of scale 
but also controls for differential effects of government policies with regard to enterprises 
of  different  size.  We  expect  to  see  a  negative  effect  of  firm  size  upon  firms’  closure 
probability. We measure firm size by employment, and  scale advantages by the deviation 
of the size of capital stock from the minimum efficient scale (MES), this being defined as 
the  average  size  of  the  largest  plants  accounting  for 50%  of  industry  employment.  It 
should be noted that size variables may also capture the characteristics of the sunk cost of 
firms in an imperfect market environment, which is especially important in transition 
economies where capital markets and labour markets are underdeveloped. An additional control for sunk costs is a measure of capital intensity. This may also be important for 
another  reason.  In  the  1980s,  the  government  targeted  the  electrical  equipment 
manufacturing industry in ways that may well have encouraged entry by enterprises with 
less than optimal capital intensity. 
 
Enterprise performance. In a market economy, this is the key to the competitive 
selection process, with poor performance punished by exit. Of course in the context of 
transition economies, the relationship may not be so straightforward, as efficient firms 
may be selectively punished by higher taxation, and inefficient firms may be encouraged 
by state subsidies. We include three types of performance measure: profitability measured 
gross profit margin, labour productivity, and an efficiency index estimated by using Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In formal models, a firm’s closure decision is based on the 
comparison of expected profit staying in the market and the expected cost of staying in 
(Dixit, 1989; Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992). Therefore, firms’ current profitability 
should have negative effects upon firms’ closure. In China, as well as in other transition 
economies, firm profitability may be only a poor signal of its viability, as both SOEs and 
COEs have to take on social responsibilities in addition to their economic objectives. A 
Firm’s efficiency index is included for two reasons: firstly, the firm’s survival ability is a 
test of firms’ efficiency in a competitive market (Bain, 1969), and the exit of less efficient 
firms  is  normal  in  a  market  economy;  secondly,  productivity  might  not  be  a  good 
indicator of enterprise performance in the context of transition economies, and higher 
productivity might actually lead to greater allocative distortion, lower profits, and lower 
efficiency - as suggested for example by Bai et al. (1997).   
 
The hardening of financial constraints. The hardening of financial constraints will 
eliminate support for under-performing firms, increasing the probability of firm closure. 
In this study, we use ratios of interest payment to fixed capital as an indicator of the 
degree of financial constraint faced by individual firms.  
 
Firms’ social burden. In China, where the social security system is just beginning to 
be set up, SOEs, which had been designed to satisfy both economic and social duties, have heavy social security and social welfare responsibilities. Those social responsibilities 
take  the  forms  of  in-house  schools,  hospitals,  employees’  housing,  health  care,  and 
pension schemes etc., and are represented by ‘unproductive capital’. In this paper, the 
share of fixed ‘productive’ capital is used to capture the effect of social burdens upon firm 
exit. The potential social burden is also captured by the numbers of employees. On one 
hand,  higher  unproductive  capital  ratio  decreases  the  level  of  return,  which  in  turn 
increases the closure probability; on the other hand, in transition economies with a poor 
social security system, those social obligations should predict against exit.  
 
Industry-level and macroeconomic factors play an important role in determining firms’ 
exit probability as well; here we consider the following factors: 
 
Market  competition.  In  a  more  concentrated  market,  the  existence  of  monopoly 
makes smaller firms more prone to failure. In order to allow for differences in the market 
environment, we also include indicators of the degree of market competition. We use the 
four largest firms’ output ratio at the three digit industry level within a city as an indicator 
of the degree of market competition.  
 
The growth of the industry. In a fast-growing industry, as Bradburd and Caves (1982) 
have found, price-cost margins tend to be high, and market penetration can be achieved 
without  causing  much  harm  to  competitors,  therefore  firms  tend  to  live  longer.  The 
higher expected profit rate of an industry will tend to attract more firms to enter the 
industry and increase the market competition. In this study, we use the percentage of 
industrial output in the electrical equipment manufacturing industry as a proxy for the 
growth of the electrical equipment manufacturing industry.   
 
Reform  stages.  As  discussed  in  section  2,  the  Fourteenth  Party  Congress  held  in 
September  1992  marked  a  roughly  two-stage  process  of  economic  reform.  We  use  a 
dummy variable to incorporate the impact of the post-1992 reforms. 
 
 5. Modelling the Exit Hazard of Chinese Enterprises  
 
This  section  sets  up  the  empirical  methodology  for  analysing  the  determination  of 
Chinese firms’ exit behaviour, and reports the results of the estimates. To analyze firms’ 
exit behaviour and to account for the right censoring nature of the dataset, we utilized 
methods  from  the  literature  on  economic  duration  data  (see,  e.g.,  Kalbfleisch  and 
Prentice, 1980; Kiefer, 1988; Lancaster, 1979), to model firm exit as a hazard rate, which 
is defined as the conditional probability that an enterprise exits in a small interval of time. 
Hazard  rate  (or  event  history)  analysis  has  been  used  extensively  in  the  study  of 
organizational mortality (Hannan and Carroll, 1992) and new firm survival (Audretsch 
and Mahmood, 1995).  
 
Theoretically, the hazard analysis can be described in terms of the probability of a firm 
exiting  in  any  period  of  time  over  our  sample  period.  Let  T  be  a  random  variable 
measuring  the  duration  of  a  particular  firm  during  1987-1996  with  a  continuous 
probability distribution  ) (t f , where  t is a realization of T . The cumulative probability 
is: 
∫ £ = =
t
t T ob ds s f t F
0
) ( Pr ) ( ) ( . 
The survival function defining the probability that a firm survives at least t is given by: 
       ) Pr( ) ( 1 ) ( t T t F t S > = - =  
 
The so-called hazard rate ) (t l  can then be derived as follows: 
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In other words the hazard rate is the instantaneous probability that a firm exits, given that 
the firm has survived up a certain point in time t.   
A widely used methodology - and that pursued here - is first to use univariate analysis 
such as Kaplan-Meier to provide non-parametric estimates of the hazard rate, before 
proceeding  to  multivariate  regression  methods.  The  univarate  approach  discloses  the 
general  trend  of  firms’  hazard  rates,  providing  useful  information for  the  appropriate 
specification  for  the  multivariate  regression  which  then  allows  for  the  analysis  of  the 
specific determinants of the hazard rate.  
 
In empirical applications the distribution of the hazard rate has taken various forms. The 
exponential distribution is a widely-used model for durations that do not exhibit much 
variation,  which  defines  the  hazard  rate  as  g l = ) (t   with  parameter  0 > g .  The 
exponential  distribution  is  sometimes  termed  ‘memory-less’,  as  the  hazard  function  is 
constant  and  reflects  no  duration-dependence.    More  flexibility  is  introduced  at  the 
expense of additional parameters. Here a popular choice is the Weibull model, where the 
hazard function is defined as 
1 ) (
- =
a ga l t t , where  0 > g  and  0 > a . In this specification, 
the  hazard  function  is  monotonically  increasing  in  duration  (positive  duration 
dependence)  if  the  scale  parameter 1 > a ,  and  monotonically  decreasing  if 1 < a ,  and 
constant  if  1 = a ,  which  is  exactly  the  exponential  model.  The  log-logistic  model  is 














. While the Weibull 
model exhibits a monotonic hazard, the log-logistic specification, has a non-monotonic 
hazard. For  1 > a the hazard first increases with duration then decreases. If 1 0 £ <a , the 
hazard function decreases with duration.  
 
 
5.1 Nonparametric  Estimation  of  the  Hazard  Function:  Kaplan-Meier 
Estimator 
 
The  Kaplan-Meier  Estimator  is  a  strictly  empirical  approach  to  survival  and  hazard 
function  estimation.  Assume  n i t t t t ,..., ,..., , 2 1   denote  the  exit  times  of  the  firms  in  the dataset, and  n i t t t t < < < < < ..., ,... 2 1 . Let  j h be the number of firms that exit after  j t , and 





t = ) ( ˆ l ,  and  the  corresponding  estimator  for  the  survival  function 
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In this section we present the smoothed Kaplan-Meier estimation of the firms’ hazard 
function.  First,  a  Kaplan-Meier  estimation  of  hazard  function  including  all  firms  is 
presented. Then, the estimated hazard functions for firms stratified by ownership, size, 
and  age  are  presented.  The  results  are  illustrated  in  Figures  3  to  6.  Meanwhile,  the 
Mantel-Cox log-rank test, and the Wilcoxon-Breslow-Gehan test are conducted to check 
whether the difference in survival patterns among stratified firms are significant.   
 
Figure 3 shows the cumulative survival function for all the firms in the sector during the 
period between 1987 and 1996, 95% confidence band are shown by the lighter lines. It 
can be seen that the hazard rate increases between 1987 and 1993, peaks in 1993, and 
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Figure 4 shows the cumulative survival of the firms stratified by ownership. It indicates 
that significant differences in survival probability exist between state- owned enterprises 
firms and collectively-owned firms. The probability of a state-owned firm surviving in the 
near future is higher than that of a collectively-owned firm. However SOEs tend to be 
bigger than other firms. Accordingly, Figure 5 shows the hazard rate by size of firm. It 
suggests that the exit probability of small firms is significantly higher than that of medium 
sized and large firms over the 10-year period. As we approach the end of the sample 
period, the exit behaviours of medium firms and large firms begin to show differences, 






























Fig 5. Smoothed Hazard Estimates, by Firm Size
 
 
Large and medium firms are more likely to survive, with small firms most likely to exit. 
This  result  is  consistent  with  the  literature:  firm  size  matters  in  determining  the 
probability of exit decisions. 
 
Finally, Figure 6 shows the smoothed hazard estimates stratified by founding periods, 
with  firms  divided  into  three  groups  according  to  when  they  were  established:  firms 
established  between1987-1996,  firms  established  between  1977  and  1986,  and  firms 
established  before  1977.    It  suggests  that  the  date  at  which  firms  were  founded  is 
important for survival and exit behaviour. The first two groups are firms founded after 
the start of economic reform, and the third group were founded before reform. Those 
three groups display different survival and exit behaviours.  Firms that were established 
prior  to  reform  have  the  lowest  hazard  rates,  while  the  most  recently  created  firms 









Fig 6. Smoothed Hazard Estimates, by Founding Time
 
 
For  all  the  above  estimations,  both  the  Mantel-Cox  log-rank  test  and  the  Wilcoxon-
Breslow-Gehan test were conducted. They all suggested that the differences in survival 
and exit patterns among different types of firms are statistically significant.  
 
5.2  Semi-parametric Estimation of the Hazard Function: Cox Proportional 
Hazard Model 
 
Through the non-parametric estimations, we have already found that firms displayed 
different survival and exit patterns; in this section we will analyse the underlying causes 
for the different survival and exit patterns through multivariate regressions. As discussed, 
both firm-specific characteristics, such as firm size, age, and performance, and industry-
specific characteristics, such as competition, entry and exit barriers, are likely to have 
effects upon firms’ exit behaviour. Furthermore, during the process of China’s transition, 
various economic reform policies also have effects upon firms’ exit behaviour.  To 
account for such effects, we allow the firm hazard rate at a particular point in time to 
depend on the realization of a set of industry and firm-specific time-varying covariates. Two popular methods are used for such multivariate analysis of the hazard rate. One is 
the proportional hazard model, referred as semi-parametric model. In this model the 
hazard function depends on a vector of explanatory variables  x with unknown 
coefficients  b and  0 l , and the hazard function of which takes the form of 
) ( ) , ( ) , , , ( 0 0 t x x t l b f l b l = , where  0 l  is called the ‘baseline hazard’, which is an 
unknown parameter representing an individual specific constant needing to be estimated. 
The effect of explanatory covariates is to multiply the baseline hazard by a factor f , 
which however does not depend on duration t and is generally defined as 
). exp( ) , (
'b b f x x =  The other method is the accelerated failure time model, referred as 
parametric model, in which the effect of covariates is incorporated by specifying the 
hazard function as  ) , ( )] , ( [ ) , , ( 0 b f b f l b l x x t x t = . This specification allows the regressors 
to rescale the duration time directly. The proportional hazard model has seen the most 
wide usage in industrial organization literature, for example Audretsch and Mahmood 
(1995) on new firm survival, Bandopadhyaya (1994) on US firm bankruptcy, Karshenas 
and Stoneman (1993) on new technology diffusion, and Disney et al. (2003) on firm 
survival in the UK manufacturing sector, etc. In our study of the influence of a set of 
industry-specific-and firm specific time variant covariates upon firms’ exit behaviour, we 
do not have any strong a priori reasons for imposing a particular functional form for the 
dependence of a firm’s hazard rate on its survival time, and we are more concerned about 
the effect of various industry-specific and firm-specific factors upon firms’ hazard rate 
than the actual hazard rate. Therefore, we choose to report here  a semi-parametric 
estimation method, although  experimentation with a variety of functional forms of 
hazard function, such as those using Weibull, Lognormal, and Exponential distributions 
(see appendix), and the differences were not found to be important. This finding is in 
keeping with other econometric studies of hazard rates (e.g., Karshenas and Stoneman, 
1993). 
 
 Following  Kiefer (1988), and Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), we allow the firm hazard 
rate at a particular time to depend on the realization of a set of common and firm-specific time-varying  covariates,  with  ) (t X i denoting  the  ith  firm’s  covariates  at  time  t. 
Therefore we construct our model as follows: 
  ) ( ) ( 0






b = . 
In estimating the proportional hazard model, Cox (1972) suggested a semi-parametric 
estimation  in  which  the  proportional  hazard  model  can  be  estimated  in  a  two-step 
procedure,  where  b   is  first  estimated  through  a  partial  likelihood  approach  without 
specifying the form of the baseline hazard function  0 l , and then  ) ( 0 t l is estimated non-
parametrically. The relevant likelihood in estimating  b , due to the proportionality of 





















where  j t are the ordered failure times, j D  is the set of observations fail at  j t ,  j R  is the set 
of  observations  that  are  at  hazard  at  time  j t ;  the  parameter  b   is  estimated  by 
maximising the partial log-likelihood function: 
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The most important assumption of the Cox proportional hazard model is that the hazard 
ratio is proportional over time.  
 
Following our discussion of the factors determining firm exit in the previous section,   the 
variables used in the regression analysis are shown in Table 2. In order to investigate the 
specific impact of reforms on the competitive process, we consider reform as a specific 
covariate, included as a straight dummy variable (P92 = 1 if t>1992), which represents 
the impact on the hazard rate facing all enterprises in the sample. We also considered the 
possibility of entirely different hazard functions by ownership type or firm size, estimating 
different  equations  by  ownership  type,  for  small  firms,  and  for  new  firms  established between  1986  and  1996.  However,  a  separate  estimation  for  larger  firm  sizes  was 
precluded by the limited numbers of observations. 
       
Table 2 Hazard Model Covariates 
Variables  Definition 
Firm Level Factors 
COE  Collective Owned Enterprises 
Foreign   Foreign Funded Enterprises (joint ventures and foreign owned) 
Others  Firms  other  than  SOEs,  COEs  and  Foreign  ,  they  are  mainly 
domestic private ownership 
Efficiency Index  DEA efficiency Index  
Profit Margin  The ratio of gross profit to sale revenue 
LN(Productivity)  Logarithm of labour Productivity 
Age  Firm’s age 
LN(Capital/MES)  Logarithm of  firm’s fixed capital normalised by Minimum Efficient 
Scale (EMS)  
LN(Employment)  Logarithm of the number of employee 
Interest  The ratio of interest payment to fixed capital 
Interest*P92  The interaction of Interest and P92  
Capital Intensity  Capital  intensity,  defined  as  the  ratio  of  capital  to  employment, 
normalised by the 3 digit industry average. 
Capintal Intensity *P92  The interaction of capital intensity and P92 
Industry Level Factors 
Industry Growth  Share  of  the  industrial  output  from  electrical  equipment 
manufacturing industry to provincial Manufacturing Industry output 
Concentration (CR4)  4  firm  Concentration  ratio  at  3  digit  industry  level  within  a  city, 
defined as the output ratio of the four largest enterprises within a 3 
digit industry under electrical equipment manufacturing in a city.  
Macroeconomic Environment 
GDP Growth  The growth rate of National GDP 
P92  Dummy variable, P92=1 if year>1992, P92=0 if year<=1992    26 
 
Table 3 presents the results from semi-parametric estimation. Using the complete sample, 
column (1), column (2), and column (3) of Table 3 alternate three performance measures 
– the DEA efficiency index, profitability, and labour productivity. Column (4) includes all 
three. In all estimates the SOE form of ownership is the benchmark ownership type. The 
results of this first set of experiments reported as shown in Table 3 consistently show that 
a number of co-variates have significant and correctly signed influences on the hazard 
rate.  Significant  positive  impacts  on  the  hazard  rate  result  from  collective  ownership 
(COE), while the effect of domestic private ownership is only marginally significant.  By 
way of example, the hazard rate facing a COE was nearly 30% or more above that for a 
SOE. Ratio of interest payment to fixed capital, 4 firm concentration ratio at 3 digit 
industry level within a city, national GDP growth, and  1992 reform dummy (P92) exert 
positive  influences  as  well.  Negative  impacts  are  coming  conversely  from  foreign 
ownership, the age of the enterprise, employment as a measure of the enterprise’s social 
burden and socialist legacy, and from the relative strength of the electrical equipment 
manufacturing  industry  in  the  Chinese  economy  as  a  whole.    Whether  entered 
alternately,  all  three  performance  measures,  efficiency,  labour  productivity,  and 
profitability  exerted  significant  negative  effects  upon  an  enterprise’s  hazard  rate. 
However, the efficiency index and labour productivity are stronger predictors of firm exit 
than profit margins, the latter being only significant (at the 10% level) when all three 
indicators are considered. 
     27 
 
Table 3 Estimated Hazard Functions for Enterprises in Liao Ning Province 1987-96: Semi-Parametric Estimation 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
All Sample with 
DEA Index as 
Performance 
Measure 




All Sample With 
Profit Margin As 
Performance 
Measure 









  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z 
COE  0.269***  0.01  0.251**  0.02  0.244**  0.02  0.260**  0.02          0.260**  0.03  0.326  0.11 
Foreign  -1.009**  0.02  -0.987**  0.02  -1.044***  0.01  -0.980**  0.02          -0.826**  0.05  -0.773*  0.09 
Other  0.041  0.89  0.132  0.65  0.002  1.00  0.140  0.63          0.200  0.51  0.805**  0.02 
Age  -0.228***  0.00  -0.245***  0.00  -0.221***  0.00  -0.247***  0.00  0.050  0.72  -0.263***  0.00  -0.244***  0.00  0.105  0.11 
DEA Efficiency Index  -0.630***  0.00          -0.291**  0.04  -1.425  0.11  -0.271*  0.06  -0.286**  0.05  -0.366**  0.04 
Ln(Productivity)      -0.189***  0.00      -0.171***  0.00  -0.256**  0.03  -0.167***  0.00  -0.171***  0.00  -0.104***  0.00 
Profit Margin          -0.017***  0.00  -0.009*  0.09  -0.007  0.93  -0.009*  0.10  -0.009*  0.09  -0.007  0.28 
Ln(CAPITAL/MES)  0.003  0.82  0.027*  0.07  0.000  0.98  0.025*  0.09  -0.071  0.39  0.028*  0.07  0.025*  0.09  0.015  0.43 
LN(EMPLOYMENT)  -0.233***  0.00  -0.265***  0.00  -0.234***  0.00  -0.264***  0.00  -0.256**  0.02  -0.258***  0.00  -0.260***  0.00  -0.246***  0.00 
Unproductive  
Capital Ratio  -0.020  0.81  0.094  0.23  0.086  0.27  0.045  0.59  0.043  0.92  0.062  0.47  0.050  0.54  -0.074  0.48 
Interest   0.070***  0.01  0.061***  0.01  0.044*  0.07  0.072***  0.00  -0.026  0.93  0.075***  0.00  0.072***  0.00  0.061**  0.02 
Capital Intensity  0.000  0.61  0.001  0.24  0.000  0.87  0.001  0.22  0.008*  0.06  0.001  0.24  0.001  0.23  0.000  0.85 
Industry Growth  -3.703***  0.00  -3.386***  0.00  -3.387***  0.00  -3.553***  0.00  -4.540***  0.00  -3.435***  0.00  -3.549***  0.00  -5.362***  0.00 
Concentration  0.732***  0.00  0.619***  0.00  0.746***  0.00  0.602***  0.00  0.965  0.14  0.582***  0.00  0.577***  0.00  0.699***  0.00 
GDP Growth  0.071***  0.00  0.065***  0.00  0.069***  0.00  0.067***  0.00  0.092***  0.01  0.063***  0.00  0.066***  0.00  0.087***  0.00 
P92  0.964***  0.00  0.938***  0.00  0.975***  0.00  0.938***  0.00  1.503***  0.00  0.902***  0.00  0.933***  0.00  0.862***  0.00 
No. of Obs  11776  11776  11776  11776  1335  10124  11167  4200 
Log-Likelihood  -11179.12  -11187.78  -11082.15  -11078.65  -424.05  -10131.93  -10919.61  -5522.87 
LR Chi(2)  680.65  663.34  711.93  718.93  81.19  568.54  645.74  299.07 
Note: *** Significant at the 1 per cent level. ** Significant at the 5 per cent level. *Significant at the 10 per cent level.   28 
Column (5) examines SOEs only. Note first that we observe a positive and potentially 
large impact coming from the reforms (P92), although this is determined very imprecisely. 
Secondly, it may be observed that neither the efficiency index nor profitability appear to 
be significant. However,  productivity is a significant factor in determining the  hazard 
rate.  
 
Column (6) offers a contrast by considering only COEs. Here we obtain results that are 
more  consistent  with  a  standard  competitive  selection  process.  Unlike  SOEs,  the 
efficiency index and labour productivity are important influences on exit rates, as is the 
new regime itself. This pattern is largely replicated in column (7) for small firms; this is not 
surprising since the samples are largely coextensive. 
 
Column (8) focuses on new enterprises established between 1986 and 1996. While the 
regression results are largely similar to those in column (4), column (6) and column (7), we 
should note that the coefficients for COE and for Other are higher although less statistically 
significant,  and  that  the  effects  of  Other  become  significant  at  5%  level.  This  might 
indicate that newly-established non-state enterprises are exposed to a higher exit hazard 
than newly-established SOEs.   
 
Through  all  regressions  presented  in  Table  3,  the  impact  of  the  reforms  is  always 
statistically insignificant. The impact of the reforms on SOEs is particularly large.  We 
suspect  that  this  might  have  captured  the  impacts  of  other  industry-level  and 
macroeconomic factors. Hence, in order to estimate directly whether the acceleration of 
economic reform since 1992 has any impact upon firms’ exit behaviours, we interacted all 
our firm-level variables with P92, and the regression results are presented in Table 4. 
Column (1) applies to the complete sample, column (2) and column (3) apply to SOE and 
COEs respectively, while column (4) and column (5) apply to small enterprises and newly-
established enterprises during the period between 1986 and 1996.  
 
The  addition  of  the  interaction  between  the  efficiency  index,  labour  productivity, 
employment, capital intensity, and P92 appear to sharpen the estimates. For example,   29 
while the efficiency index, and labour productivity now exert a larger negative impact on 
the probability of firm exit, the interactive terms are here all positive. We believe that this 
may be reflecting a higher propensity under the new regime for firms, probably more 
efficient  firms,  to  exit  as  a  result  of  their  acquisition.  We  also  now  observe  that 
employment exerts a larger (negative) impact on the probability of firm exit, while the 
interactive term exerts a significant and positive effect. This may indicate that under the 
new  regime,  employment  poses  a  less  important  barrier  to  firm  exit.  The  significant 
negative effect of high capital intensity exists only after 1992.  All these seem to suggest 
the post-1992 reforms have changed the determinants of exit behaviour. However, the 
additions of interactions between capital, the unproductive capital ratio, interest and P92 
are not statistically significant. It should be noted here that for SOEs, the negative effect 
of interest upon exit probability is larger in the post 1992 period, indicating a possible 
‘lock-in’ effect between SOEs and state banks.    
 
These results indicate that,  compared to SOEs,  the probability of enterprises to  exit 
during  1986-1996  tends  to  be  higher  for  COEs  and  for  firms  categorized  as  ‘other’, 
suggesting that SOEs do enjoy some advantages in regard to the exit hazard and which 
arisies from their unique place in the transition.  By contrast, foreign-funded enterprises 
tend to have the highest survival probability even after controlling for other variables. 
The firms categorised as other, which can be regarded as China’s de novo firms, are the least 
likely to survive over the sample period.  This may be due to the fact that most of the 
firms so classified are private or partially private firms, and it was not until 1996 that they 
acquired their legitimate status; before 1996 they were discriminated against in accessing 
bank loans and applying for investment quotas, etc.  
 
Looking at the effect of firm performance measures on exit probabilities, we find that the 
impact of labour productivity is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for all 
regressions.  Similarly, the effects of the individual efficiency index and profit margin 
upon exit probabilities are also negative, and are statistically significant once again with 
the exception of SOEs and new firms. In general, we find that labour productivity is a 
better  predictor  of  the  hazard  posed  by  exit,  and  this  is  true  even  when  all  three   30 
performance  measures  are  included.  Our  results  suggest  that  a  doubling  of  labour 
productivity tends to reduce firms’ hazard rate by around 19%. 
 
In estimating the effect of size on the exit hazard, our analysis suggests a significantly 
negative effect of both size (as measured by employment) and relative scale advantage in 
some regressions. On the one hand, this indicates that scale advantage and associated 
sunk costs play an important role in exit determination, while on the other hand also 
capturing the effect of resource reallocation costs associated with firms’ exit in China 
where the capital market and labour market are underdeveloped, and the social security 
system has just begun to emerge. Capital intensity – which may also be associated with 
sunk costs - shows a negative effect upon hazard rates in our regression with interactive 
terms, indicating that the higher the capital intensity the lower the closure probability 
since 1992.  
 
In estimating the impacts of financial constraints upon their exit probability, our proxy 
for this effect,  the interest ratio, appears to have different effects upon SOEs and non-
SOEs. While for COEs, small enterprises and newly-established enterprises, this effect is 
positive and significant at 10% level for COEs, for SOEs it is negative though not 
statistically significant, and this negative effect seems to have increased since 1992. This 
suggests that SOEs are still facing soft budget constraints.  
 
As to whether the acceleration of reforms since 1992 has had any impacts upon firms’ exit 
hazard, by using a reform period Dummy (P92) and by interacting firm-level factors with 
P92, our analysis suggests that reform since 1992 has generally increased hazard rates 
especially among SOEs, with the signs of coefficients for the firm-level variables and the 
signs the corresponding interactive terms generally taking opposite signs.  
 
Other industrial and macroeconomic factors have also played an important role in 
shaping firm closure in China. Our analysis suggests that industry growth has a significant 
negative effect on the hazard posed, while the three digit industry concentration ratio at 
city level and GDP growth both have  significant positive effects.    31 
 
Table 4 Estimated Hazard Functions for Enterprises in Liao Ning Province 1987-96: Semi-
Parametric Estimation with Interactive Terms 
  (1) Whole 




  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z 
COE  0.295***  0.01          0.296***  0.01  0.377*  0.07 
foreign  -0.877**  0.04          -0.743*  0.08  -0.632  0.17 
other  0.166  0.57          0.234  0.44  0.854***  0.01 
AGE  -0.243***  0.00  0.008  0.95  -0.258***  0.00  -0.240***  0.00  0.086  0.19 
Efficiency Index  -0.543*  0.06  -3.906**  0.04  -0.463*  0.08  -0.550*  0.06  -1.086**  0.03 
Efficiency Index 
*P92  0.384  0.23  2.904  0.15  0.309  0.34  0.398  0.22  0.847  0.11 
Ln(Productivity)  -0.300***  0.00  -0.394  0.15  -0.311***  0.00  -0.296***  0.00  -0.116  0.13 
Ln(Productivity) * 
P92  0.157***  0.00  0.184  0.54  0.175***  0.00  0.153***  0.00  0.017  0.82 
Profit Margin  -0.009  0.54  0.022  0.97  -0.009  0.54  -0.010  0.51  -0.011  0.51 
Profit Margin * P92 0.002  0.91  -0.049  0.94  0.002  0.91  0.002  0.88  0.006  0.74 
Ln(Capital/MES)  -0.013  0.57  -0.254*  0.06  -0.004  0.86  -0.009  0.72  -0.044  0.27 
Ln(Capital/MES) 
*P92  0.032  0.18  0.255*  0.06  0.019  0.45  0.027  0.27  0.043  0.27 
Ln(Employment)  -0.330***  0.00  -0.322  0.12  -0.301***  0.00  -0.321***  0.00  -0.369***  0.00 
Ln(Employment) 
*P92  0.133***  0.00  0.078  0.70  0.107***  0.01  0.126***  0.00  0.179**  0.02 
Unproductive 
Capital Ratio  -0.111  0.58  -1.542  0.22  -0.053  0.79  -0.096  0.63  -0.653*  0.07 
Unproductive 
Capital Ratio *P92  0.160  0.46  1.633  0.22  0.101  0.65  0.146  0.50  0.578  0.13 
Interest Ratio  0.049  0.38  -0.065  0.79  0.053  0.33  0.050  0.37  0.051  0.52 
Interest Ratio*P92  0.032  0.60  -0.251  0.68  0.029  0.63  0.031  0.61  0.016  0.85 
Capital Intensity  0.018***  0.00  0.016***  0.00  0.021***  0.00  0.018***  0.00  0.021***  0.00 
Capital Intensity 
*P92  -1.845***  0.00  -1.587***  0.03  -2.181***  0.00  -1.849***  0.00  -2.178***  0.00 
Industry Growth  -3.043***  0.00  -4.132**  0.02  -2.845***  0.00  -3.026***  0.00  -4.460***  0.00 
Concentration  0.640***  0.00  1.170*  0.07  0.615***  0.00  0.616***  0.00  0.777***  0.00 
GDP Growth  0.061***  0.00  0.093***  0.01  0.056***  0.00  0.061***  0.00  0.084***  0.00 
No. of Obs  11776  1335  10124  11167  4200 
Log-Likelihood  -11043.85  -419.14  -10100.28  -10886.71  -5502.39 
LR Chi(2)  788.53  91.02  631.84  711.54  340.02 
Note: *** Significant at the 1 per cent level. ** Significant at the 5 per cent level. *Significant at the 10 per 
cent level. 
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6  Conclusions 
 
This paper has  argued that the competitive  selection process in China is likely to be 
increasingly important for two main reasons. First, as the agricultural sector as a source of 
surplus  labor begins  to  decline,  the  release  of resources for  the  continuing  growth  of 
manufacturing  may  have  to  come  from  elsewhere  and  increasingly  from  the  exit  of 
relatively inefficient enterprises. Second, the peculiarities of the reform process in China 
place additional emphasis on the role of competition (and probably for small firms in 
particular)  as  a  substitute  for  more  traditional  forms  of  corporate  governance.  
Accordingly the paper provides and empirical examination of this competitive selection 
process in an important sector of Chinese manufacturing, looking in particular at the 
hazard posed by firm closure, and for changes resulting from the latest stage of reforms, 
namely the transition to the ‘socialist market economy’.  
 
Our analysis suggests that for small firms and COEs, the competitive selection process 
operates much as we would expect it to in a private market economy.  The study also 
suggests that it is insufficient to analyze the competitive process from the point of view of 
new  firm  entry  and  incumbent  firm  growth  alone.  Indeed  the  substantial  rate  of 
‘churning’ of enterprises that we observe in this sector means that a study of exit is just as 
important  as  that of  entry for  output  and  productivity  growth.  Moreover this rate  of 
churn (for both entry and exit) appears to have increased substantially in the latest phase 
of reform. Our estimates from a hazard model of exit probabilities suggest that exits do 
contribute to efficiency within the small firm/COE sector since performance indicators 
serve as useful predictors of rates of industrial exit. However we do not find evidence that 
profits or efficiency indices are any better predictors of exit as a result of the latest reforms 
for firms with this ownership structure. 
 
On the other hand, our analysis indicates a largely different story for SOEs:  conventional 
enterprise performance measures are not good predictors of their demise and we find no 
conclusive evidence that things have changed since 1992. While their role in the economy   33 
is  declining  as  other  sectors  have  established  faster  growth  rates,  their  continuing 
privileged status does not yet appear to have come under serious threat. Consequently, we 
do not as yet find that competitive selection is providing a sufficiently important substitute 
for  corporate  governance  mechanisms  based  on  ownership  and  monitoring  of 
management. This may well represent a considerable challenge for economic policy in 
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